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For quite some time now there has been a debate between those who insist that conceptual analysis is a 
matter of determining the conditions necessary and sufficient for falling under a concept, or belonging to a kind, 
and those who believe that if this is what conceptual analysis is, then conceptual analysis is futile. Perhaps the 
debate has become quieter in the last decade or so, but members of each side still seem to find it incredible that 
their position is not unanimously accepted by now. I would like to examine the possibility that there really is not 
as much disagreement here as has been supposed. To illustrate what I mean, in this paper I will consider three 
theories which have been proposed as alternatives to the Classical necessary and sufficient conditions account 
of analysis: Cluster Concepts,
1 
Paradigms,
2 
and Prototypes.
3  
 
A couple of motives for suggesting these alternatives stand out. The first, and less significant, stems from the 
idea that if there are necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under a concept then all concepts must have 
―sharp borders.‖ That is, it has often been assumed that if a concept is analyzable into necessary and sufficient 
conditions, then there must be a fact of the matter for each particular as to whether or not it falls under that 
concept. (Eleanor Rosch makes this mistake. See below.) As William Alston, Robert Richman and others have 
shown, however, the Classical account involves no such implication.
4 
If the basic concepts into which a more 
complex concept is analyzed are themselves vague, and there is nothing in the Classical account to rule this out, 
then that vagueness can be inherited by the analysans. So, for instance, even if we grant that there are necessary 
and sufficient conditions for being a bachelor, and that one of these necessary conditions is being an adult, we 
can still admit that the concept bachelor is vague. It is as vague as adult is. 
 
A more substantial reason for discontent with the Classical view is that no property can be mentioned in a 
Classical analysis unless possession of that property is a necessary condition for falling under the concept being 
analyzed. It is obvious, on the face of it, that this really is a consequence of the Classical view. The question is 
what this amounts to and whether or not it is a bad thing. There is a strong intuitive pull towards including in an 
analysis some properties which are not had by every member. For instance, not all tigers are fierce, and not all 
games are fun, but it still seems as if complete analyses of tiger and game should have something to say about 
being fierce and being fun, respectively. The Cluster Concept view deals with this intuition by mentioning all of 
the intuitively plausible properties in the analysis, but only requiring that something possess a subset, or cluster 
of these properties in order to fall under the concept. Depending on the particular version of this view under 
discussion, the requirements for membership in a cluster concept can be quite complex. For instance, the 
requirement might not just be that the particular has enough of the properties in the concept. Maybe it has to 
possess at least one property from a few distinct groupings. Membership in the kind might require at least one 
property from a variety of different groupings: three from group A, one from group B, etc. Some medical terms, 
such as ―schizophrenia,‖ provide clear instances of terms which can be seen as working this way.(1) two of the 
following: 
(2) bizarre delusions… 
(3) prominent hallucinations… 
5 
A patient is said to have this condition if he or she exhibits an appropriate cluster of the symptoms associated 
with it, though few if any patients will exhibit all of these symptoms.  
The above is supposed to conflict with Classical analysis because, while Classical analysis insists that the 
analysis of a concept involves only those properties which a thing absolutely must have in order to belong to the 
relevant kind, many of the properties involved in Cluster Concept analyses are not necessary in this way. 
Notice, however, that this alleged conflict relies on the assumption that all the properties involved must be 
simple. More precisely, there is an assumption that conjunctive and disjunctive properties do not count. If these 
properties do count, then there is no substantive difference between Cluster Concept analyses and those of the 
Classical theory. When one says that each particular must have one or more properties from various subsets, the 
other says that each particular must have the corresponding disjunctive properties.
6 
In other words, while the 
Cluster Concept theory might say that x is a T just in case x has at least three of the five properties A, B, C, D, E 
and at least two of the four properties F, G, H, I, Classical analysis can say that x must possess the two 
following properties: [(A & B & C) v (A & B & D) v (A & B & E) v (B & C & D) v (B & C & E) v (C & D & 
E)], and [(F & G) v (F & H) v (F & I) v (G & H) v (G & I) v (H & I)]. Or, even more radically, it can conjoin 
these two complex properties and hold that there is a single complex property which is necessary and sufficient 
for being a T.  
A parallel comparison can be made between tradition and the Paradigm theory. Again, as far as I can tell the 
main motivation for proposing this alternative is to allow into analyses properties which are not necessary for 
membership in the relevant kind. In this case this is accomplished by requiring that every kind include paradigm 
members, and holding that other members belong to the kind, or fall under the concept, in virtue of their 
resemblance to these paradigms. While paradigms must possess all of the properties involved in an analyses, 
non-paradigm members need not.  
Although conjunctive and disjunctive properties will not save the Classical theory here, relational properties 
will. From a Classical perspective the claim of the Paradigm theory is that a certain type of relational property is 
necessary for membership in certain kinds. Briefly, the required relational properties are those of resembling the 
paradigms in sufficient ways. More specifically, assume that a paradigm T must possess properties A, B, C, D, 
and thus that the necessary and sufficient condition for being a paradigm T is possession of the property A & B 
& C & D. Let us call this property ‗E‘. Let us call the property of resembling something which has E ‗R‘. The 
Classical account can now say that: x is a T iff x possesses the property (E v R). Or, if we allow that things 
resemble themselves, all that is required is R.  
Of course, one might worry that some account of R is still owed. But one might similarly worry that the 
Paradigm theory owes an explanation of what counts as sufficient resemblance to a paradigm. The person who 
advocates the Paradigm theory can make one of two replies (assuming a ―Classical‖ analysis will not be 
offered): one can either insist that this is a basic relation, in need of no analysis, or can offer an analysis in the 
spirit of the Paradigm theory itself.
7 
It should be easy to see that these options are available to the Classical 
account as well. Even for the Classical account, some relations are basic. And any Paradigm analysis of 
resemblance to a paradigm can be handled in the manner described above.  
 
One of the most sophisticated proposed alternatives to the Classical account is the Prototype theory. This 
theory has been developed primarily in psychology, rather than philosophy, most notably by Eleanor Rosch. 
Unfortunately, it is clear that a primary motivation behind Rosch‘s development of this theory is her belief that, 
―…when describing categories analytically, most traditions of thought have treated category membership as a 
digital, all-or-nothing phenomenon.‖
8 
As noted above, Classical analysis is by no means committed to a 
―digital‖ account of category membership. If any of the properties necessary for membership are vague, the 
category will have borderline members. Nevertheless, the Prototype theory is currently one of the most viable 
alternatives to the Classical necessary and sufficient conditions account, and so warrants further examination.  
The Prototype theory is best thought of as falling under the heading of Cluster Concepts. A Prototype, like a 
Cluster, and unlike a Paradigm, is an abstraction.
9 
A prototype is a cluster or collection of properties relevant to 
membership in a kind. Prototypical members possess a relatively high percentage of the properties or features in 
the prototype, thus particular members can be more or less prototypical. What the Prototype theory adds to the 
more general Cluster Concept view is a couple of specific ideas about the ways in which possession of the 
properties in the relevant prototype (or cluster) qualifies something for membership in a kind. Basically, there 
are two relevant factors: (a) How many of the properties mentioned in the prototype does the object possess? (b) 
How unlikely is it that a particular which falls under the extension of another expression in the same contrast set 
would possess this property? (A contrast set is a set of expressions which fall under one superordinate or 
determinable term and which cannot simultaneously be true of the same thing. For instance, ―cat,‖ ―dog,‖ and 
―cow‖ belong to the same contrast set because they all fall under the term ―mammal,‖ and no more than one of 
these terms can apply to a give particular.)  
In ―Concepts, Prototypes and Information,‖ Richard Grandy offers the following formal characterization of 
when, according to the Prototype theory, x falls under a specific concept (or is to be included in a specific kind 
or category): 
x is in Ci iff x satisfies the superordinate term and x is more similar to the prototype Pi of Ci than to 
any prototype Pk of any other category Ck in the same contrast set.
10 
(my emphasis) 
The main thing to note about this definition is that it provides necessary and sufficient conditions for 
membership in Ci. Assuming this is a more or less accurate account, the Prototype theory is clearly another 
necessary and sufficient conditions account and, in this sense, falls within the Classical tradition.
11 
 
Interestingly, Rosch not only offers the Prototype theory as an alternative to the Classical account. She also 
believes that it can explain why the Classical account, though mistaken, has been so seductive: 
 
If the more prototypical members of a category are those which have most attributes common to other 
members of the category it is probable that they are most likely to have attributes in common with 
each other…. Thus, if subjects think of the best examples of the category when hearing the category 
name…, the illusion of common elements is likely to arise and persist — an illusion which may be 
what makes definition of categories in terms of criterial attributes appear so reasonable.
12 
 
Unfortunately, I doubt that this accurately captures why many philosophers feel that there must be necessary 
and sufficient conditions. The primary motivation for myself and, I believe, for others, is bewilderment about 
how else we can explain the more or less unanimous agreement about whether or not new instances fall under 
old concepts. This bewilderment is by no means neatly satisfied by a Prototype account. Or, to put the point 
more precisely, this bewilderment is only satisfied to the degree that we see the Prototype theory as subsumed 
under the Classical.  
Once we begin to see the pattern here, it should not surprise us. Theories which are supposed to provide 
alternatives to necessary and sufficient conditions are generally going to be suggesting what they take to be 
other conditions for falling under a concept. If they are saying that a particular must conform to these conditions 
in order to fall under the concept, they are giving necessary conditions. If they assert that all particulars 
conforming to these conditions fall under the concept, they are giving sufficient conditions. It should not be 
surprising when a theory which makes claims such as these turns out to be a theory which, in the end, gives 
necessary and sufficient conditions.  
One possible reply to this is to deny that Classical analyses do/should make use of the sorts of properties 
mentioned above: relational, conjunctive, and disjunctive.
13 
The claim that they do not make use of such 
properties is simply false. Roderick Chisholm is a paradigm example of a philosopher who uses the Classical 
analytic method. As the following illustrates, he has no qualms about providing extremely complex analyses: 
S is justified in believing that p = Df (i). It is evident for S that p; and (ii) if it is defectively evident 
for S that p, then the proposition that p is entailed by a conjunction of propositions each of which is 
either (a) evident but not defectively evident for S or (b) a proposition implying with respect to one of 
the other conjuncts that it is evident for S.
14  
 
What of the claim that Classical analyses should not make use of complex properties? To begin with, one 
who makes such a claim owes us a method for determining which properties are properly simple. The project of 
analysis itself assumes a recognition that our terms often do not indicate simple properties. 
 
 
More importantly, there is something rather awkward about insisting that adherents of the Classical account 
should avoid complex disjunctive analyses, while at the same time criticizing that account for problems which 
are easily solved if it makes use of them.  
Considerations such as the ones just given lead me to suggest that the differences between those who 
advocate necessary and sufficient condition analyses, and those who criticize them have been greatly 
exaggerated. This is not to say that there is no point in taking seriously those theories which have been proposed 
as alternatives. It is only to say that, in general, their value is to be found in the sorts of conditions they suggest, 
not in the fact that they do this without providing necessary and sufficient conditions. Nor is this to say that 
there could be no theory of analysis which did not attempt to provide necessary and sufficient conditions. It is 
only to say that we should have a clearer awareness of how radically different such a theory would be.  
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